Re: caller ID and implementer's guide
Pete,
Just a note about the security matter you mention. Some PC based H.323 endpoints allow one, with just a little knowledge, to persuade them to output debugging which includes all elements of decoded RAS/Q.931-H.225.0/H.245 messages. This is clearly "undesirable" when security of information contained in such messages is required! It also might be quite hard for some people to switch off. I don't have a solution to this: I just raise it as an issue.
Regards, Chris -- Dr Chris Purvis - Senior Development Engineer, WAVE CC Software Madge Networks Ltd, Wexham Springs, Framewood Road, Wexham, Berks. ENGLAND Phone: +44 1753 661 359 email: cpurvis@madge.com
-----Original Message----- From: Pete Cordell [mailto:pete.cordell@BTINTERNET.COM] Sent: 13 May 1999 10:05 To: ITU-SG16@MAILBAG.INTEL.COM Subject: Re: caller ID and implementer's guide
Paul,
I now understand where you are coming from when you say that the first scheme is proprietary.
However, I think it's slightly different because, although someone might be upset if you sent H.261 data to an H.263 decoder, they are unlikely to sue you for disclosing information that has been requested to be kept private, as might be the case if the calling party's telephone number is displayed when it has been requested not to be. Hence the need for trust, because if the entity you send the information to does not honour your request, you could end up with some very expensive legal fees!
(As a side note, some sort of calling party id is probably required for legal reasons, such as tracing emergency calls. Hence remaining private by not including the calling party id is not an option. I'm not sure if this is what we are talking about , but what is really needed is something that only lets those that are allowed to know to access the information. The case of the switched network is slightly different to that of IP because the former is essentially a secure network behind a firewall. The Internet and most other IP networks does not generally mirror this model and so a different solution is required. What is probably required is a supplementary service that does call tracing using suitable cryptographically secure tokens that are known only to those that are allowed to do call tracing.)
Pete
============================================= Pete Cordell pete.cordell@btinternet.com =============================================
-----Original Message----- From: Paul Long Plong@SMITHMICRO.COM To: ITU-SG16@MAILBAG.INTEL.COM ITU-SG16@MAILBAG.INTEL.COM Date: 12 May 1999 14:20 Subject: Re: caller ID and implementer's guide
Pete,
Sorry. I did indeed believe that you were saying that a
vendor could take
ownership of an IE, which would be a proprietary and rather dangerous solution. "We" or "SG16" in place of "you" might have been a
better choice of
words. Your first solution is still proprietary, though. Your counter
argument
is weak because one could use it for all otherwise
proprietary features, e.g.,
"only send H.261 on a channel established for H.263 to an
entity that you
trust to expect this."
Paul Long Smith Micro Software, Inc.
-----Original Message----- From: Pete Cordell [SMTP:pete.cordell@BTINTERNET.COM] Sent: Wednesday, May 12, 1999 6:27 AM To: ITU-SG16@MAILBAG.INTEL.COM Subject: Re: caller ID and implementer's guide Paul, I disagree that these are proprietary solutions. The first is a matter of policy and so falls into aslightly grey
area, but ideally the standard would say something like 'only send
presentation
restricted information to an entity that you trustto honour the
request.'
The second is definitely NOT an action you could take at aproprietary
level as the standards body still holds the right to
define new IEs. Any
such action would have to be approved by the standards
body. When I said
'...YOU could take further ownership...', the 'you' was
intended to refer to
SG16.
As such a change is small and localised, it would be safe toimplement
it even if it was mentioned only in a determined
document (which is the
way the procedure is supposed to work after all anyway!)
which could be
achieved at the Chile meeting. A fix in the ASN.1 would have to
wait for the
decided version as that needs to wait until all such
additions are present.
Pete ============================================= Pete Cordell pete.cordell@btinternet.com =============================================
participants (1)
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Chris Purvis